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“DISTURBING SCHOOLS” LAWS: DISTURBING DUE
PROCESS WITH UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
LIMITS ON STUDENT BEHAVIOR
Rachel Smith*
“The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects
the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of
Education not excepted. . . . That they are educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes.”
1
INTRODUCTION
For over a century, the United States Supreme Court has held, in
sum and substance, that students do not “shed their constitutional
rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”
2
In practice, however, while not
shed entirely, many of those rights have been increasingly limited.
In 2016, footage of a South Carolina high school student being
hurled across her classroom went viral.
3
She and Niya Kenny, the
girl who filmed the incident, were arrested pursuant to South
Carolina’s “Disturbing Schools” Law,
4
which subjects students to
* J.D. Candidate 2020, Brooklyn Law School.
1
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
2
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
3
Evie Blad, She Recorded Her Classmate’s Arrest, Then Got Arrested, Too,
ED WEEK (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/01/25/she-
recorded-her-classmates-arrest-then-got.html.
4
(A) It shall be unlawful: (1) for any person wilfully or
unnecessarily (a) to interfere with or to disturb in any way or in
any place the students or teachers of any school or college in
this State, (b) to loiter about such school or college premises or
(c) to act in an obnoxious manner thereon.
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criminal charges for behaving in a distracting or obnoxious manner
on campus—behavior which can easily be conceptualized as typical
teenage behavior.
5
After finding this incident to be just one among
hundreds, the ACLU agreed to file suit on behalf of 19-year-old
Kenny and several other plaintiffs,
6
arguing that the statute was
unconstitutional.
7
The suit, Kenny v. Wilson, was dismissed for lack
of standing in the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in
March 2018.
8
The court found that the law endangered freedom of
expression and due process and remanded for further proceedings
on those two grounds.
9
In May of 2018, following the Fourth
Circuit’s decision in Kenny and related incidents, South Carolina
amended its Disturbing Schools Law to apply exclusively to non-
students,
10
therefore protecting students from arrest by law
enforcement as a means of disciplining on-campus behavior. The
amended law targets the behavior of visitors on school property
(including, for example, non-student spectators attending on-
campus sporting events).
11
S.C. CODE. ANN. § 16-17-420(A) (2019).
5
Amanda Ripley, How America Outlawed Adolescence, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/how-
america-outlawed-adolescence/501149/.
6
Taurean NeSmith, 21, an African-American student at Benedict
College in Columbia, was arrested because he criticized a
police officer for racial profiling during the stop of a fellow
student. S.P., 15, a white student with behavioral and emotional
disabilities at Travelers Rest High School in Greenville, was
charged with a crime after failing to comply with instructions
to leave the school library and cursing at a student who was
making fun of her.
Kenny v. Wilson, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/kenny-v-wilson (last
updated Mar. 16, 2017).
7
Id.
8
Kenny v. Wilson, No. 2:16-cv-2794 (CWH), 2017 WL 4070961, at *8
(D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2017) rev’d, 885 F.3d 280.
9
Kenny v. Wilson, 885 F.3d 280, 288–89, 291 (4th Cir. 2018).
10
Audrey Biesk, Disturbing Schools Law Amended After Decades of Being
‘Unconstitutionally Vague’, WMBF NEWS,
https://www.wmbfnews.com/story/38876154/disturbing-schools-law-amended-
after-decades-of-being-unconstitutionally-vague/ (Aug. 13, 2018, 11:27 PM).
11
Id.
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Disturbing Schools Laws
12
that target students are not contained
to South Carolina’s past, however. Around the same time as the
Kenny decision, police arrested a seventh-grader in NewMexico for
repeatedly fake burping in class; his arrest came pursuant to a state
statute prohibiting disruptive behavior in schools.
13
The child’s
mother initiated A.M. v. Holmes, a civil rights action against the
police officer and school officials involved, alleging unlawful arrest
and excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment
after her son was taken to a juvenile detention center.
14
The district
court awarded all defendants qualified immunity, and the Tenth
Circuit affirmed.
15
The appellate opinion came with a scathing
dissent from then-Circuit Court Judge Neil Gorsuch.
16
Despite that
hopeful dissent, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, and the
thirteen-year-old boy was left without recourse.
17
Neither the Disturbing School Laws nor the disproportionality
with which they affect students of color are unique to South Carolina
12
At least 22 states and dozens of cities and towns currently
outlaw school disturbances in one way or another. South
Dakota prohibits “boisterous” behavior at school, while
Arkansas bans “annoying conduct.’” Florida makes it a crime
to “interfere with the lawful administration or functions of any
educational institution”—or to “advise” another student to do
so. In Maine, merely interrupting a teacher by speaking loudly
is a civil offense, punishable by up to a $500 fine.
Ripley, supra note 5.
13
Id.
14
A.M. ex rel. v. F.M. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1132 (10th Cir. 2016).
15
Id. at 1169.
16
If a seventh grader starts trading fake burps for laughs in gym
class, what’s a teacher to do? Order extra laps? Detention? A
trip to the principal’s office? Maybe. But then again, maybe
that’s too old school. Maybe today you call a police officer.
And maybe today the officer decides that, instead of just
escorting the now compliant thirteen year old to the principal’s
office, an arrest would be a better idea. So out come the
handcuffs and off goes the child to juvenile detention. My
colleagues suggest the law permits exactly this option and they
offer ninety-four pages explaining why they think that’s so.
Respectfully, I remain unpersuaded.
Id. at 1170 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
17
A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Acosta, 137 S. Ct. 2151, 2151 (2017).
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or New Mexico. But, using Kenny as a model, students may find
they have both standing and due process protection to challenge
Disturbing Schools Laws across the country due to the vague nature
of these laws and opportunities for arbitrary enforcement that result
from the same.
18
Part I of this Note will focus on the history of zero-tolerance
policies including Disturbing Schools Laws and relevant existing
state statutes that restrict and target on-campus disturbances. Part II
will analyze current case law, particularly the opposing outcomes
from the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, as well as the Fourth Circuit’s
concerns with due process. Part III of this Note will examine the
current consequences of these laws and the disparate impact they
have on students of color—often funneling black and brown
children into the criminal justice system for noncriminal behavior at
a higher percentage than white children.
19
Finally, Part IV will
discuss why the Fourth Circuit in Kenny was correct in recognizing
the students’ standing to bring due process and First Amendment
claims, and how South Carolina’s new Disturbing Schools Law can
serve as an example for civil rights groups looking to challenge
similar instances of de facto discrimination across the country.
20
18
Students of color are more likely to be viewed as acting
criminally. The Department of Education reports that
nationwide, Black students are more than twice as likely as
white classmates to be referred to law enforcement. These
disparities in school arrests for minor infractions like “disorder”
and “disturbance” are consistent with research suggesting that
bias is more likely to play a role in categories of discipline that
are harder to define objectively, such as “disrespect.”
ACLU, BULLIES IN BLUE: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL
POLICING 22 (2017),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_bullies_in_blue_4_
11_17_final.pdf.
19
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FORCIVILRIGHTS, 2015–2016 CIVILRIGHTS
DATA COLLECTION SCHOOL CLIMATE AND SAFETY 3 (2018),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/school-climate-and-safety.pdf.
20
Legal English: “De Facto/De Jure”, WASH. U. ST. LOUISSCH. LAW (Dec.
28, 2012), https://onlinelaw.wustl.edu/blog/legal-english-de-factode-jure/ (“De
facto means a state of affairs that is true in fact, but that is not officially sanctioned.
In contrast, de jure means a state of affairs that is in accordance with law (i.e. that
is officially sanctioned).”).
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I. HISTORY OF ZERO-TOLERANCE ANDDISTURBING SCHOOLS
LAWS
Over the past seventy years, broad zero-tolerance policies
21
have
morphed from providing harsh, exacting punishment for public
crimes outside the “schoolhouse gate”—drug-dealing, drug-use,
possession of weapons, and more—to policies designed to give
school officials vast authority to punish students for any number of
behaviors even on school premises. Teenagers have been charged
“more than 10,000 times a year” under Disturbing Schools Laws on
the books in at least twenty-two states across the country.
22
This
section will explore the evolution of Disturbing Schools Laws as a
product of broader zero-tolerance policies. In particular, it will
examine how biases and racially framed origins of such policies
have caused students of color and students with disabilities to bear
the brunt of their largely arbitrary enforcement.
21
Farnel Maxime, Zero-Tolerance Policies and the School to Prison
Pipeline, SHARED JUST. (Jan. 18, 2018), http://www.sharedjustice.org/domestic-
justice/2017/12/21/zero-tolerance-policies-and-the-school-to-prison-pipeline
(“Zero-tolerance policies require school officials to give students a specific,
consistent, and harsh punishment, usually suspension or expulsion, when certain
rules are broken. The punishment applies regardless of the circumstances, the
reasons for the behavior (such as self-defense), or the student’s history of
disciplinary problems.”).
22
Ripley, supra note 5.
Over the years, judges around the country have landed on
various definitions of disturbance. In Georgia, a court
concluded, a fight qualifies as disturbing school if it attracts
student spectators. But a Maryland court found that attracting
an audience does not create a disturbance unless normal school
activities are delayed or canceled. In Alabama, a court found
that a student had disturbed school because his principal had
had to meet with him to discuss his behavior; an appeals court
overturned the ruling on the grounds that talking with students
was part of a principal’s job.
Id.
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A. Introduction of School Policing: Cultural Moments,
Authority, and Disparate Impacts on Minority Students
To say that curbing disorderly on-campus behavior was the
singular motivation for today’s zero-tolerance policies is to suggest
that American public schools exist in a vacuum, unaffected by the
behavior of adults outside “the schoolhouse gates.”
23
In fact, several
distinct factors converged in the early 1990s to birth a policy that, to
this day, can put a child in handcuffs for fake burping in class.
24
One
such factor was racist motivation to police racial minority students,
a motivation with lasting cultural effects.
25
While zero-tolerance
policies were originally intended to protect students from outside
adults, they began to be used against students inside schools in the
Civil Rights Era. The convergence of zero-tolerance policies and
civil rights struggles created a tense environment in which the line
between normal teenage behavior and criminality began to blur. As
a result, behavior that once would have resulted in a “slap on the
wrist,” an afternoon detention, or, at worst, a brief suspension, can
now land a student in handcuffs.
26
Los Angeles serves as a case study. As the Los Angeles schools
became increasingly integrated due to the efforts of civil rights
leaders in the late 1940s, the Los Angeles Police Department
(“LAPD”) formed a unit specifically dedicated to school behavioral
policing.
27
The LAPD formed this unit in 1948 to maintain order
23
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been
the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years.”); seeMaxime, supra
note 21 (noting that in-school zero-tolerance policies grew out of “broken-
windows policing” and the War on Drugs zero-tolerance policies in the 1980s).
24
Rachael Revesz, Court Defends Arrest of 13-Year-Old-Boy for Burping
During Class, INDEP. (July 31, 2016, 17:25),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/burping-court-upholds-
defends-arrest-13-year-old-boy-student-new-mexico-a7165296.html.
25
See generally Maxime, supra note 21 (suggesting that studies show a
correlation between the disproportionate impact of zero-tolerance policies on
students of color and the school to prison pipeline).
26
A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1132 (10th Cir. 2016).
27
See ACLU, supra note 18, at 3.
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and quell violence in newly-integrated schools and communities.
28
From there, police presence in schools only continued to grow as
white Americans complained that “a lack of discipline among Black
children would bring disorder to white schools.”
29
In 1957,
policymakers in New York City formed a special juvenile justice
committee that proposed stationing police in every public school;
30
in practice, however, “the [police] efforts were directed almost
exclusively at poor Black and Latino neighborhoods.”
31
Ten years
later, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration identified reducing juvenile delinquency and youth
crime, particularly in communities of color, as the greatest challenge
facing the criminal justice system, prompting legislators and law
enforcement officials to consider methods for targeting youth in
low-income, minority communities.
32
Citing “roving bands of
Negro youth” and “continual youth warfare,” the committee
prompted Congress to pass the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968
33
(the “Act”), which provided federal funding
for programs geared toward preventing youth crime in America’s
largest cities
34
and established the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (“LEAA”).
35
This legislation would lay the
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. (“Representatives of the New York City Police Department (NYPD)
depicted Black and Latino students in low-income neighborhoods as ‘dangerous
delinquents’ and ‘undesirables’ capable of ‘corroding school morale.’”).
32
See generally PRESIDENT’SCOMM’NONLAWENF’T&ADMIN.OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf (The report discusses, at length, that
crime is concentrated in “the slums” of large cities, which blacks and other
minority groups disproportionately inhabit).
33
See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 34 U.S.C. §
10101 (2017); ACLU, supra note 18, at 4.
34
See ACLU, supra note 18, at 5.
35
[The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was
e]stablished June 19, 1968, to develop new techniques and
systems to strengthen law enforcement and criminal justice.
The Institute made grants to public agencies, colleges and
universities, and private organizations; and conducted studies
and research in corrections, criminology, police science, public
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groundwork for zero-tolerance policies and Disturbing Schools
Laws that would eventually change the way students were
disciplined, funneling black and brown students into the criminal
justice system for school-based offenses.
36
In Kansas City, Missouri, a program funded by the LEAA
“allowed teachers and school administrators to classify students as
young as nine years old as ‘pre-delinquent,’” putting them at risk of
police contact for even the smallest transgressions.
37
In the 1970s,
the Chicago Police Department went beyond patrolling the city’s
South Side and began sending plainclothes officers onto public
school campuses.
38
The introduction of policing in the classroom reflected larger
cultural and political shifts following the Civil Rights Movement
and VietnamWar.
39
Years of protests, riots, and general civil unrest
administration, and law. By 1974, the Institute also served as a
national and international clearinghouse for the exchange of
criminal justice information. With passage of the Justice
System Improvement Act on December 27, 1979, its functions
were absorbed by the National Institute of Justice.
Records of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/423.html (last
updated Aug. 15, 2016).
36
[S]tudents all over the country face disciplinary procedures that
deliver harsh predetermined punishments, rather than focusing
on restorative practices. Ultimately, this disproportionate way
of looking at school discipline plays a major role in
perpetuating the school to prison pipeline. The “school to prison
pipeline” refers to a national trend in which school policies and
practices are directly and indirectly pushing students out of
school and on a pathway to prison. Often zero-tolerance
policies in schools funnel students into this pipeline.
Maxime, supra note 21.
37
ACLU, supra note 18, at 5 (“Some school districts lacked any definition
of pre-delinquency. Others defined pre-delinquency by reference to behaviors—
‘short attention spans . . . [and] quick temper[s]’—recognized today as likely
associated with learning or cognitive disabilities.” (citation omitted)).
38
Id.
39
See Terence McArdle, The ‘Law and Order’ Campaign That Won Richard
Nixon the White House 50 Years Ago, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2018/11/05/law-order-campaign-that-
won-richard-nixon-white-house-years-ago/?utm_term=.abde5489a239 (quoting
Professor Julia Azari on the 1968 Presidential Race and Richard Nixon’s law-and-
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had policymakers, including President Richard Nixon, calling for a
return to “law and order.”
40
President Nixon publicly declared a
“War on Drugs,” describing drug abuse as “public enemy number
one.”
41
President Reagan expanded on Nixon’s work in the 1980s,
and in a twenty-year period, the country saw the incarcerated
population of non-violent drug offenders climb from 50,000 to
400,000.
42
Reagan’s stance on drug policy was met by Congress’s
1986 passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, establishing mandatory
minimum sentences for certain drug offenses.
43
The “law and order”
movement quickly found its way into the classroom. In 1975,
Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act,
44
granting law enforcement full authority under federal law “to
engage with youth based on assumptions of future behavior” during
a time when rates of school-based violence were wildly
exaggerated.
45
School Resource Officers became fixtures in schools. Part Q of
Title I of the Act, as amended, defines a School Resource Officer
(“SRO”) as a “career law enforcement officer, with sworn authority,
deployed in community oriented policing, and assigned by the
employing police department or agency to work in collaboration
with school and community-based organizations.”
46
In 1967,
Baltimore City Public Schools added over twenty full-time officers
to its schools; Washington D.C. officers—armed and unarmed—
order message, “There was some pushback against the Great Society and civil
rights but also the VietnamWar. . . . It was a referendum on 8 years of a Democrat
presidency and a very close race.”).
40
Id.
41
The War on Drugs, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/crime/the-
war-on-drugs (last updated June 7, 2019).
42
A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE,
http://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war (last visited Sept. 27,
2019).
43
The War on Drugs, supra note 41.
44
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 34 U.S.C. § 11101
(2019) (original version at 42 U.S.C.A § 5601 (1974)).
45
ACLU, supra note 18, at 5–6.
46
See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 34 U.S.C.
§10389 (2017).
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added elementary schools to their regular beats.
47
By 1972, forty
states had some form of policing within their schools.
48
B. Broken Windows and Increased Harshness in School
Policing
The addition of law enforcement officers to the classroom was
later met with the development of an overly-harsh preventative
method of policing, best characterized by crime prevention
strategies in New York.
49
In 1993, New York City Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani and his Police Chief Richard Bratton implemented a new
approach to law enforcement called “broken-windows” policing.
50
It was the brainchild of Harvard social scientist James Q. Wilson
and his colleague George Kelling.
51
The “broken windows” model
functions as follows:
[A]t the community level, disorder and crime are
usually inextricably linked, in a kind of
developmental sequence. Social psychologists and
police officers tend to agree that if a window in a
building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest
of the windows will soon be broken. This is as true
in nice neighborhoods as in rundown ones. Window-
breaking does not necessarily occur on a large scale
because some areas are inhabited by determined
window-breakers whereas others are populated by
window-lovers; rather, one unrepaired broken
47
ACLU, supra note 18.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 7.
50
Chris Benderev et al.,How a Theory of Crime and Policing Was Born, and
Went Terribly Wrong, NPR (Nov. 1, 2016),
https://www.npr.org/2016/11/01/500104506/broken-windows-policing-and-the-
origins-of-stop-and-frisk-and-how-it-went-wrong.
51
James Crotty, A Broken Windows Approach to Education Reform, FORBES
(Aug. 30, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesmarshallcrotty
/2013/08/30/a-broken-windows-approach-to-education-reform/#620abbab4274.
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window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking
more windows costs nothing.
52
Law enforcement sought to prevent serious crimes by curbing lesser
ones.
53
It was with this theory in mind that school districts and states
began implementing policies that over-reacted to minor violations
in the hopes of preventing more serious ones in the future.
54
The government’s strict approach to criminal justice began to
overlap with education policy
55
in 1990 with Congress’ passage of
the Gun-Free School Zone Act, a piece of legislation which would
lay the framework for harsh disciplinary rules on school grounds:
Each State receiving Federal funds under any
subchapter of this chapter shall have in effect a State
law requiring local educational agencies to expel
from school for a period of not less than 1 year a
student who is determined to have brought a firearm
to a school, or to have possessed a firearm at a
school, under the jurisdiction of local educational
agencies in that State, except that such State law shall
allow the chief administering officer of a local
educational agency to modify such expulsion
requirement for a student on a case-by-case basis if
such modification is in writing.
56
Schools used this strong language as “a model for a broadly punitive
approach to youth behavior in schools.”
57
The combination of broad
discretion and the increased presence of SROs gave school
administrators wide latitude to punish schoolyard behaviors as
52
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-
windows/304465/.
53
See, e.g., Maxime, supra note 21 (“For instance, the police would stop
and arrest people for panhandling, disorderly conduct, and public drinking in
order to prevent and decrease the number of rapes, robberies, and murders.”).
54
Id.
55
Id. (“Zero-tolerance policies were written into school handbooks in the
1990s, created originally to be a deterrent for bringing weapons into schools. . . .
With this theory in mind, school districts and states began cracking down on
minor violations to prevent serious crimes from occurring in the future.”).
56
Gun-free requirements, 20 U.S.C. § 7961(b)(1) (2018).
57
ACLU, supra note 18.
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criminal offenses.
58
As a result, things like insubordination, cutting
in line, and possessing over-the-counter medication like Aspirin
59
could result in suspension or expulsion at best, and criminal charges
at worst, with black and brown children catching the brunt of the
punishment.
60
In 1994, the federal government formed the Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services (“COPS”) through the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act and allocated $9
billion to increasing police presence in public schools and their
surrounding communities.
61
SROs
62
became commonplace,
58
Ripley, supra note 5.
59
Each state and school system var[ies] in their approach and
language surrounding zero-tolerance policies, but the common
punishments of suspension and expulsion from school come
from the following offenses: bringing any weapon to school,
including seemingly innocent items like butter knives and toy
swords, having any alcohol or drugs on campus, including
tobacco and over-the-counter medications like Aspirin or
Midol, fighting, including minor scuffles, threatening other
students or teachers, or saying anything that could be perceived
as a threat, insubordination, which could include talking back
to a teacher or swearing in the principal’s office, and any
behavior considered disruptive, such as cutting in a lunch line.
Maxime, supra note 21.
60
When it came to clear-cut offenses, like using a weapon,
African American students were no more likely than other
students to get in trouble in Texas. But they were far more likely
to be disciplined for subjective violations like disrupting class.
Even after controlling for more than 80 variables, including
family income, students’ academic performance, and past
disciplinary incidents, the report found that race was a reliable
predictor of which kids got disciplined.
Ripley, supra note 5.
61
ACLU, supra note 18, at 8.
62
In the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Act, the
federal government defined an SRO as: [A] career law
enforcement officer, with sworn authority, deployed in
community-oriented policing, and assigned by the employing
police department or agency to work in collaboration with
school and community-based organizations to—(A) educate
students in crime and illegal drug use prevention and safety; (B)
develop or expand community justice initiatives for students;
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particularly in public schools serving predominantly low-income
and minority students.
63
SROs were intended to add an element of
safety to the school environment while also acting as community
liaisons.
64
They were not, however, supposed to usurp the role of
school disciplinarian—day-to-day discipline was to remain in the
hands of teachers, staff, and school administrators.
65
In fact, in order
to receive funding through the COPS program, applicant schools
were required to submit a memorandum of understanding which
clearly indicated that “SROs will not be responsible for requests to
resolve routine discipline problems involving students.”
66
Thus,
while they had the power to arrest students for disruptive behavior,
they were also in a position to befriend, mentor, and support
students.
67
With zero-tolerance policies in place, however, it proved
difficult for SROs to embrace this latter, critical role, as school
administrators relied on SROs to do their disciplinary work for
them.
68
Lisa Thurau, Founder and Director of Strategies for Youth, and
Johanna Wald, Director of Strategic Planning for the Charles
Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law
School, poignantly articulated the ultimate ongoing positional
conflict:
and (C) train students in conflict resolution, restorative justice,
and crime and illegal drug use awareness.
Amanda Merkwae, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and the Conduct of
School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 157 (2015) (citing 20
U.S.C. § 7161(11) (2018)).
63
Id.
64
See About NASRO, NAT’L ASS’N SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS,
https://nasro.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
65
Community Oriented Policing Services, Supporting Safe Schools, U.S.
DEP’T JUSTICE, https://cops.usdoj.gov/supportingsafeschools (last visited Sept.
27, 2019) (“Beyond law enforcement, [School Resource Officers (“SROs”)] also
serve as educators, emergency managers, and informal counselors. While an
SRO’s primary responsibility is law enforcement, whenever possible, SROs
should strive to employ non-punitive techniques when interacting with students.
Arrests should be used only as a last resort under specified circumstances.”).
66
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM OFUNDERSTANDING FACT SHEET
2 (2017), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2017AwardDocs/chp/MOU_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
67
See About NASRO, supra note 64.
68
See ACLU, supra note 18, at 7–8.
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Administrators perform the duties of law
enforcement, but retain the power of a school
administrator. SROs may act like teachers and
counselors, but they have the power and authority of
law enforcement agents.
69
The ambiguities in disciplinary roles, combined with the vague
behavioral guidelines established by Disturbing Schools Laws,
place students in a precarious position and provide immense
discretion to the school administrators and SROs who work in
tandem to enforce them.
II. DISRUPTIVELYVAGUE ORVAGUELYDISRUPTIVE?
One of the prevailing standards in substantive criminal law is
that statutes defining punishable offenses must be specific enough
to provide notice to the public of what behavior is prohibited and
limited to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
70
Statutes that are deemed impermissibly vague are void on
constitutional grounds as a violation of due process. Disturbing
Schools Laws are impermissibly vague and thus unconstitutional.
A. The Vagueness Doctrine in Criminal Law
The Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Morales that a
law cannot be so vague that a person of ordinary intelligence is
unable to understand what is innocent conduct and what is illegal.
71
In Morales, the Court held that an Illinois law was an
unconstitutional violation of due process because it was
“unconstitutionally vague.”
72
In 1992, the Chicago City Council
69
Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law
Enforcement Meets Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 985
(2009/2010).
70
See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999).
71
Id. at 56.
72
Id. at 51, 56 (“Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two
independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable
ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize
and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (citation
omitted)).
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enacted the “Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibit[ed]
‘criminal street gang members’ from ‘loitering’ with one another or
with other persons in any in any public place.”
73
The city ordinance
made loitering (as defined by the statute) a criminal offense
punishable by “a fine of up to $500, imprisonment for not more than
six months, and a requirement to perform up to 120 hours of
community service.”
74
Under the ordinance, guilt was predicated on
all four of the following:
First, the police officer must reasonably believe that
at least one of the two or more persons present in a
“public place” is a “criminal street gang member.”
Second, the persons must be “loitering,” which the
ordinance defines as “remaining in any one place
with no apparent purpose.” Third, the officer must
then order “all” of the persons to disperse and
remove themselves “from the area.” Fourth, a person
must disobey the officer’s order. If any person,
whether a gang member or not, disobeys the officer’s
order, that person is guilty of violating the
ordinance.
75
In 1998,Morales came before the United States Supreme Court after
the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a ruling that the ordinance was
violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
76
Finding for Morales, the Court upheld the Illinois Supreme Court’s
ruling that the ordinance was violative of due process by virtue of
being unconstitutionally vague.
77
The Court used the two-prong test
for unconstitutional vagueness established in Kolender v. Lawson, a
1983 case regarding the language of criminal law statutes.
78
Under
that test, a criminal law may fail for either of two independent
73
Id. at 45–46.
74
Id. at 47.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 46.
77
Id. at 47; City of Chicago. v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 59, 64 (Ill. 1997)
(holding that “the gang loitering ordinance violates due process of law in that it is
impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.
. . . The freedom to engage in such harmless activities is an aspect of the personal
liberties protected by the due process clause.”).
78
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
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reasons: (1) a criminal law may fail to provide notice of what
conduct it prohibits, or (2) it may authorize or encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.
79
In Morales, the Court found that
the Chicago ordinance failed under both prongs of the test.
80
Discussing the statute’s articulation of conduct, the Court stated
that, while the term “loiter” may have a broader public meaning, the
vague definition of “loitering” in the statute was fatal to its
constitutionality because it failed to provide adequate notice about
what behavior was permitted and what was prohibited:
[T]he term “loiter” may have a common and
accepted meaning, . . . but the ordinance’s definition
of that term—“to remain in any one place with no
apparent purpose”—does not. It is difficult to
imagine how any Chicagoan standing in a public
place with a group of people would know if he or she
had an “apparent purpose.”
81
This vagueness about what loitering is covered and what is not
dooms the ordinance.
82
The city argued that adequate notice was
provided because an individual would not be subject to punishment
unless he or she failed to comply with “an officer’s order to
disperse.”
83
The Court emphasized that the notice requirement exists
to allow a citizen to “conform his or her conduct to the law” and
further noted that, if the loitering itself only becomes a violation
following an order to disperse, “the dispersal order itself is an
unjustified impairment of liberty.”
84
Citing Coates v. Cincinnati, the
Court found that the “ordinance [was] therefore vague ‘not in the
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise
but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that
no standard of conduct is specified at all.’”
85
Turning to the second prong, the Court agreed with the Illinois
Supreme Court that the statute “provide[d] absolute discretion to
79
Morales, 527 U.S. at 56 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357).
80
See id. at 56–63.
81
Id. at 56–57.
82
Id. at 57.
83
Id. at 58.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 60 (citing Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)).
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police officers to decide what activities constitute loitering.”
86
The
Court also noted that “[t]he ‘no apparent purpose’ standard” for
deciding whether or not a dispersal order should be issued was
“inherently subjective” and completely at the discretion of the
officer on the street:
Presumably an officer would have discretion to treat
some purposes—perhaps a purpose to engage in idle
conversation or simply to enjoy a cool breeze on a
warm evening—as too frivolous to be apparent if he
suspected a different ulterior motive. Moreover, an
officer conscious of the city council’s reasons for
enacting the ordinance might well ignore its text and
issue a dispersal order, even though an illicit purpose
is actually apparent.
87
While acknowledging that the police were conscious of the potential
for arbitrary enforcement and that Chicago faced a unique challenge
in that there were gang members who did, in fact, create a hostile
environment by loitering, the Court ruled on the side of personal
liberties and held that the statute was impermissibly vague.
88
B. What Rights Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates?
Tinker v. Des Moines has long been the standard for the breadth
of authority granted to school officials.
89
In 1965, several students
from Des Moines, Iowa planned to wear black armbands at school
during the holiday season to protest the war in Vietnam.
90
When the
principals of several schools in the community became aware of
these plans, they “adopted a policy that any student wearing an
armband to school would be asked to remove it, and if he refused[,]
he would be suspended until he returned without the armband.”
91
Petitioner John Tinker wore an armband to school and was sent
86
Id. at 61 (citations omitted).
87
Id. at 62.
88
Id. at 63–64.
89
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504
(1969).
90
Id.
91
Id.
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home.
92
Tinker filed suit in United States District Court for Southern
District of Iowa, Central Division, seeking an injunction against the
school and damages.
93
He alleged that the school had violated the
students’ freedom of expression under the First Amendment.
94
The
District Court dismissed the complaint, as did the Eighth Circuit on
appeal, finding the behavior was disruptive enough to warrant
disciplinary action.
95
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and found
that “the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of [the] case was
entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by
those participating” and was “closely akin to ‘pure speech,’”
96
which remains uncontestably protected under the First
Amendment.
97
Citing West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, the Court affirmed that “[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment . . . protects the citizen against the State itself and all of
its creatures—the Board of Education is not excepted.”
98
The Court
noted, however, that school officials must be able to create and
maintain a safe controlled environment, and, as such, conceded the
authority to “prescribe and control conduct in schools” that the
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
See id. at 504–05.
95
Id.
96
See id. at 505 (distinguishing “pure speech,” defined as “entirely divorced
from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it,” from
symbolic speech, exemplified by the wearing of armbands in protest of the
Vietnam War).
97
Id. at 506–07.
98
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States,
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures—Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions,
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill
of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is
reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes.
Id. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943)).
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government may not necessarily have over the average adult
citizen.
99
Addressing the District Court’s conclusion, the Court
stated that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of a disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression. . . . [O]ur [C]onstitution says we must take this risk.”
100
Thus, the Court held that barring a material disruption of the work
or invasion upon another student’s rights, a school does not have the
right to limit its students’ expressions.
101
Most often, conflict surrounding the relationship between a
school’s authority over its students and students’ fundamental rights
arises in the context of search or seizure of a student’s possessions
on school property.
102
The concept of due process as it relates to
disciplinary behavior, however, has remained relatively untouched,
giving broad deference and authority to school officials to conduct
campus life in a manner they see fit.
103
Historically, the Supreme
Court has found that students are not protected from searches by
school administrators in the same way that average citizens are
protected under the Fourth Amendment.
104
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
99
On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States
and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in
the schools. . . . Our problem lies in the area where students in
the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of
the school authorities.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
100
Id. at 508.
101
Id. at 514.
102
See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (2004) (establishing due
process within the school disciplinary process); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 348–50 (1985) (covering Fourth Amendment boundaries); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (rejecting claim that use of corporal punishment
in schools was a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
103
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 (1985) (“Against the child’s interest in
privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in
maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds.”).
104
See id. at 337 (The reasonableness of a search and seizure depends on
“the context in which the search takes place. . . . On one side of the balance are
arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security;
on the other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches
of public order.”).
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the Supreme Court articulated boundaries surrounding the power of
school officials acting in an investigatory capacity.
105
In T.L.O., a
New Jersey high school teacher discovered two freshmen smoking
cigarettes in the school bathroom.
106
The teacher sent the students to
the assistant principal, who then searched the respondent’s bag, in
which he found cigarettes, rolling papers, marijuana, and cash.
107
At
trial, the respondent sought to suppress the evidence seized from her
bag, arguing that the search was unlawful.
108
The Court found that
the “underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that
searches and seizures be reasonable” and that what is reasonable
“depends on the context within which a search takes place.”
109
There
must be a balance, taking into consideration the privacy interests of
a student and the “school officials’
110
need to maintain discipline by
recognizing qualitative differences between the Constitutional
remedies to which students and adults are entitled.”
111
The Court,
finding for the State, held that school safety, as a matter of public
interest, outweighed the countervailing interest of student
privacy.
112
Justice White remained convinced that “[t]his standard
will, we trust, neither unduly burden the efforts of school authorities
to maintain order in their schools nor authorize unrestrained
105
Id. at 334.
106
Id. at 328.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 329.
109
Id. at 336–37 (“If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult
to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than
public authority when conducting searches of their students.”).
110
Id. at 350 (Powell, J., and O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing school
officials as those tasked with “the education and training of young people”).
111
Id. at 349.
112
We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in
concluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of
schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and
administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does
not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be
based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search
has violated or is violating the law.
Id. at 341 (majority opinion).
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intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren.”
113
Despite the
Court’s emphasis on the privacy interests of students, in practice,
this standard has given school officials broad authority to encroach
further upon the students’ privacy interests.
III. DISTURBING SCHOOLS LAWS IN PRACTICE
The content and enforcement of Disturbing Schools Laws vary
from state to state and even city to city, but most share a striking
lack of specificity in terms of what behaviors can be punished and
to what extent.
114
For example, Arkansas prohibits “annoying
conduct” without any definition of “annoying.”
115
Florida makes it
a crime to “interfere with the lawful administration or functions of
any educational institution” without specifying what behaviors
constitute interference worthy of prosecution.
116
South Dakota
prohibits “boisterous” behavior—without defining what constitutes
criminally “boisterous” behavior—while interrupting a teacher in
Maine is a civil offense punishable by up to a $500 fine.
117
113
By focusing attention on the question of reasonableness, the
standard will spare teachers and school administrators the
necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable
cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the
dictates of reason and common sense. At the same time, the
reasonableness standard should ensure that the interests of
students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve
the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.
Id. at 342–43.
114
Ripley, supra note 5.
115
Id.; ARK. CODE. ANN § 6-21-606 (West 2019) (The statute does not define
“boisterous” or annoying behavior though it relies on such language for
determining guilt. “Any persons who shall, by any boisterous or other conduct,
disturb or annoy any public or private school in this state . . . shall be guilty of a
violation and upon conviction shall be fined in any sum not exceeding one
hundred dollars ($100), payable into the general school fund of the county.”).
116
Ripley, supra note 5; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 877.13 (West 2019)
(The Florida statute does not define “disruption,” “disturbance,” or “interference,”
giving broad discretion to school officials and law enforcement to decide what
behavior is punishable as a “misdemeanor of the second degree.”).
117
Ripley, supra note 5; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-6 (2019)
(South Dakota also uses the term “boisterous” without definition in its
“Disturbance of school as a misdemeanor” statute.).
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From June 2010 to May 2018, South Carolina had a Disturbing
Schools Law that made it a misdemeanor to:
wilfully or unnecessarily . . . interfere with or to
disturb in any way or in any place the students or
teachers of any school or college in this State . . . ,
loiter about such school or college premises[,]
or . . . to act in an obnoxious manner thereon.
118
The statute did not, however, articulate or define what it meant to
“disturb” or what it meant to take certain actions in an “obnoxious
manner.”
119
New Mexico currently has a similarly ambiguous law
that makes it a misdemeanor to “interfere with the educational
process of any public or private school by committing, threatening
to commit or inciting others to commit any act which would disrupt,
impair, interfere with or obstruct the lawful mission, processes,
procedures or functions of a public or private school.”
120
The
legislature made no effort to articulate or define the kinds of
disruptive conduct punishable as a criminal offense, leaving
students with language so vague that they may not be able to
articulate disruptive behavior that will result in simple scholastic
discipline or distinguish between such behavior and that which is
impermissible to the point of being criminally punishable.
IV. TESTINGDISTURBING SCHOOLS LAWSAGAINSTMORALES
In the past five years, lawmakers have begun to push back
against the schools, officers, and state statutes that allow innocuous
pre-teen or teenage behavior to place students in handcuffs.
121
Kenny v. Wilson was a landmark decision in this area, and its
influence was amplified by the great deal of public attention it
garnered.
122
As mentioned, in Kenny, a group of former South
Carolina high school students filed suit against the school district,
alleging that South Carolina’s Disturbing Schools Law
123
was
118
S.C. CODEANN. § 16-17-420(A) (2019).
119
Id.
120
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-13(D) (West 2019).
121
Ripley, supra note 5.
122
See id.
123
§ 16-17-420.
378 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
unconstitutionally vague.
124
The suit arose after a video circulated
of a South Carolina high school student who refused to put her
phone away being yanked from her desk and dragged across the
floor by an SRO.
125
Niya Kenny, the student who filmed the
incident, was arrested and booked under the South Carolina
Disturbing Schools Law.
126
The student plaintiffs’ complaint put forth a due process
argument, contending that the law was unconstitutionally vague,
thus violating the plaintiffs’ due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment because the law “fail[ed] to provide sufficient notice of
prohibited conduct and encourage[d] arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.”
127
The district court dismissed the case for a lack of
standing, reasoning that the “the plaintiffs’ fear of future arrest and
prosecution under the two statutes [did] not rise above speculation
and thus [did] not constitute an injury in fact.”
128
The Fourth Circuit revisited the complaint and reversed the
lower court’s decision, finding that the plaintiffs in Kenny had the
standing to bring a suit.
129
The court used the test from Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, which held that to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff
“must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable
to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”
130
To establish injury
in fact, the plaintiff must show that said injury is “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent.”
131
In Kenny, the court
found that a plaintiff may rely on future injury for purposes of
standing, so long as that plaintiff can show that the “threatened
injury is certainly impending or there is a substantial risk that the
harm will occur.”
132
One way the Fourth Circuit has allowed
124
Kenny v. Wilson, 885 F.3d 280, 284 (4th Cir. 2018).
125
Ripley, supra note 5.
126
Kenny, 885 F.3d at 285.
127
Id. at 286.
128
Id. at 284.
129
Id.
130
Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defs.
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
131
Id. at 1548.
132
Kenny, 885 F.3d at 287 (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573
U.S. 149, 158 (2014)).
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plaintiffs to show this is by showing that the defendant has not
disavowed enforcement of the law in question.
133
The court found
injury in fact because many of the plaintiffs had been punished under
the Disturbing Schools Law, and it found that the threat of further
punishment was imminent because the school district had not
disavowed enforcement of the law.
134
Kenny resulted in a victory for students’ rights, as the Fourth
Circuit found the plaintiffs had standing and remanded for further
proceedings, permitting the students to challenge the Disturbing
Schools Law for violating their freedom of expression and due
process.
135
Those claims have yet to be tried. Similarly, A.M. v.
Holmes exemplifies another challenge to a Disturbing Schools Law,
though the resulting Tenth Circuit opinion was characterized by a
discussion and grant of qualified immunity that barred the plaintiff
from bringing claims like those in Kenny.
136
However, both cases
show a trend of challenging Disturbing Schools Laws, a trend which
future challenges to similar statutes should premise on the
vagueness test cited in City of Chicago v. Morales, wherein the
Supreme Court required that criminal laws provide notice of the
prohibited behavior so as not to encourage or enable arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement.
The version of the South Carolina Disturbing Schools statute at
issue in Kenny, instituted in 1976 and amended in 2010, read:
(A) It shall be unlawful:
(1) For any person wilfully or unnecessarily (a) to
interfere with or to disturb in any way or in any place
the students or teachers of any school or college in
this State, (b) to loiter about such school or college
premises or (c) to act in an obnoxious manner
thereon; or
(2) For any person to (a) enter upon any such school
or college premises or (b) loiter around the premises,
except on business, without the permission of the
principal or president in charge.
133
Kenny, 885 F.3d at 288.
134
Id. at 289.
135
Id. at 284.
136
A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1129 (10th Cir. 2016).
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(B) Any person violating any of the of the provisions
of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and,
on conviction thereof, shall pay a fine of not more
than one thousand dollars or be imprisoned in the
county jail for not more than ninety days.
137
In deciding Morales, the Supreme Court of Illinois found that the
use of the term “loitering” in the statute at issue “drew no distinction
between innocent conduct and conduct calculated to cause harm.”
138
The United States Supreme Court agreed, noting that “freedom to
loiter for innocent purposes” constituted part of the “liberty” which
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects and
recalled that it had previously identified the “‘right to remove from
one place to another according to inclination’ as ‘an attribute of
personal liberty’ protected under the Constitution.”
139
Holding the language of the South Carolina statute to the same
standard as that used in Morales, it is clear that the Disturbing
Schools statute, before its amendment, was “impermissibly vague
on its face and [constituted] an arbitrary restriction on personal
liberties.”
140
Part (A)(1)(a) of the statute made it illegal to “interfere
with or to disturb in any way or in any place the students of . . . any
school or college in th[e] [s]tate.”
141
The language of this statute
drew no distinction “between innocent conduct and conduct
calculated to cause harm” and provided no definitions.
142
With no
distinction or definition of specific conduct that triggered the statute,
a sneeze that interrupts the teacher’s train of thought, a student who
needs to leave the room quickly due to illness or emergency, or
another who absentmindedly checks her cell phone and giggles
could technically “disturb in [some] way” the course of class and
could result in a misdemeanor charge for the student under the
statute.
143
Enforcement against every such “disturbance,” however,
can easily become arbitrary and discriminatory.
137
S.C. CODEANN. § 16-17-420(A)–(B) (2019).
138
City of Chicago. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1999) (citing City of
Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 60–61 (Ill. 1997)).
139
Id. at 53 (citing Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 129 (1990)).
140
Id. at 50 (citing Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 59).
141
§ 16-17-420.
142
Morales, 527 U.S. at 50–51.
143
§ 16-17-420(1).
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Like the Chicago ordinance at issue in Morales, Part (A)(1)(b)
used the term “loiter” but drew no distinction between innocent
conduct and that calculated to cause harm.
144
Indeed, much of what
“elementary and secondary students (who are in many ways
disorderly or boisterous by nature)” do in between classes and on
school grounds during lunch and after school—such as standing
around in the halls or gathering in groups—could likely be
characterized as loitering for purposes of the statute.
145
In Morales,
the Court found that “since the city [could not] conceivably have
meant to criminalize each instance a citizen stands in public . . . the
vagueness that dooms this ordinance is not the product of
uncertainty about the normal meaning of ‘loitering,’ but rather about
what loitering is covered by the ordinance and what is not.”
146
What
the South Carolina legislature had attempted to do with the
Disturbing Schools Law was exactly what the Court forbids: “[t]he
Constitution does not permit a legislature to ‘set a net large enough
to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside
and say who could rightfully be detained.’”
147
The South Carolina statute also did not define what “obnoxious”
behavior looks like for the purposes Part (A)(1)(c).
148
Merriam-
Webster defines “obnoxious” as “odiously or disgustingly
objectionable; highly offensive,” but offers no additional
guidance.
149
Whether in sight, sound, or behavior, what is obnoxious
to one person may not be obnoxious to another. This is particularly
true as applied to the behavior of teens or children as opposed to
144
Id.; see also Morales, 527 U.S. at 61–62 (“That the ordinance does not
apply to people who are moving—that is, to activity that would not constitute
loitering under any possible definition of the term—does not even address the
question of how much discretion the police enjoy in deciding which stationary
persons to disperse under the ordinance.”).
145
Kenny v. Wilson, 885 F.3d 280, 290 (4th Cir. 2018).
146
Morales, 527 U.S. at 57.
147
Id. at 60 (citing United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876)).
148
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2019) (lacking any definition of the
word “obnoxious”).
149
Obnoxious, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/obnoxious (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
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adults.
150
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit noted that elementary and
secondary students are “in many ways disorderly and boisterous by
nature,” and thus the vagueness of the Disturbing Schools Law had
the potential to restrict students’ freedom of speech and expression,
thus chilling student engagement.
151
NewMexico’s current Disturbing Schools Law, at issue in A.M.,
falls within the category of Crimes Against Public Peace and reads
in pertinent part:
(D) No person shall willfully interfere with the
educational process of any public or private school
by committing, threatening to commit or inciting
others to commit any act which would disrupt,
impair, interfere with or obstruct the lawful mission,
processes, procedures or functions of a public or
private school. . . . (F) Any person who violates any
of the provisions of this section shall be deemed
guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
152
In A.M., the Tenth Circuit upheld a grant of qualified immunity to
the SRO and school administrator defendants.
153
Qualified
immunity is a defense that “protects governmental officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”
154
In a dispute over qualified
immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that there was a
constitutional violation and that an “objectively reasonable officer
could not have thought the force was constitutionally
150
[T]hat is, adolescents are more likely to take greater risks and
to reason less adequately about the consequences of their
behavior. . . . There can be no doubt that many incidents that
result in disciplinary infractions at the secondary level are due
to poor judgement on the part of the adolescent involved.
AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N ZERO-TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, ARE ZERO-
TOLERANCE POLICIES EFFECTIVE IN THE SCHOOLS? 855 (2008)
https://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/zero-tolerance.pdf.
151
Kenny v. Wilson, 885 F.3d 280, 290 (4th Cir. 2018).
152
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-13(D), (F) (West 2019).
153
A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1129 (10th Cir. 2016).
154
Id. at 1134.
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permissible.”
155
The court concluded that “there was no clearly
established law indicating that A.M.’s minor status could negate
Officer Acosta’s customary right to place an arrestee in
handcuffs.”
156
Holding the New Mexico statute at issue in A.M to the same
standard for vagueness as that in Morales, the constitutionality of
the statute comes into question, and with it, the protection of
qualified immunity. Qualified immunity applies where the
defendant acts in a manner that is constitutional or that he reasonably
believes to be constitutional.
157
It follows that, if the statute
encouraging the behavior is unconstitutional by virtue of being
violative of due process rights, the SROs’ behavior is no longer
subject to the protections of qualified immunity.
158
In affirming the
finding of qualified immunity, the Tenth Circuit implicitly held that
the New Mexico statute was not substantively unconstitutional,
despite the clearly egregious use of force against a twelve-year-old
for burping in class.
159
The plaintiff in A.M. was denied the
opportunity to pursue First or Fourteenth Amendment claims, and
the United States Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s petition for
certiorari.
160
155
Id. at 1151.
156
Id. at 1152.
157
See id. at 1151.
158
Id.
159
Often enough the law can be “a ass—a idiot,” CHARLES
DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 520 (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1941)
(1838)—and there is little we judges can do about it, for it is (or
should be) emphatically our job to apply, not rewrite, the law
enacted by the people’s representatives. Indeed, a judge who
likes every result he reaches is very likely a bad judge, reaching
for results he prefers rather than those the law compels. So it is
I admire my colleagues today, for no doubt they reach a result
they dislike but believe the law demands—and in that I see the
best of our profession and much to admire. It’s only that, in this
particular case, I don’t believe the law happens to be quite as
much of a ass as they do. I respectfully dissent.
Id. at 1170 (Gorsuch, Cir. J., dissenting).
160
A.M. ex rel. v. Acosta, 137 S. Ct. 2151, 2151 (2017).
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The NewMexico statute, however, is as vague as—if not vaguer
than—the one at issue in Kenny.
161
Looking carefully at its
language, the statute prohibits “any act” that might “disrupt, impair,
[or] interfere with” the functions of a public or private school.
162
The
statute does not further define any of those terms, nor does it place
a scienter requirement on the action.
163
As it stands, under the
common use of “disrupt” or “interfere,” a hiccup, a cough, or a
sneeze could technically and subjectively force a student to face
criminal consequences. If a student suddenly became ill and fell to
the ground, or bumped into another student’s desk, creating noise
and commotion, he would certainly be guilty of causing disruption,
albeit unintentionally. Enforcement of the statute is essentially
arbitrary and vulnerable to a facial attack. As the Court noted in
Morales, “[t]his is not an ordinance that ‘simply regulates business
behavior and contains a scienter requirement’ but is in fact ‘a
criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement.’”
164
The Court
concluded that any such law would be vulnerable to a facial
attack.
165
The breadth of the statute’s interpretation due to its
ambiguity “allows the ordinance to reach a substantial amount of
innocent conduct,” thus an inquiry into the “moment-to-moment
judgement” of law enforcement officers is necessary.
166
The arrest
161
The American Civil Liberties Union filed a federal lawsuit
challenging South Carolina’s “disturbing schools” law. The law
allows students in school to be criminally charged for normal
adolescent behaviors including loitering, cursing, or undefined
“obnoxious” actions on school grounds. The ACLU is also
challenging a similarly vague “disorderly conduct” law, which
prohibits students from conducting themselves in a “disorderly
or boisterous manner.” The statutes violate due process
protections of the Constitution.
Kenny v. Wilson, supra note 6.
162
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-13(D) (West 2019) (emphasis added).
163
See generally id. (failing to define or articulate what might constitute such
behavior).
164
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (quoting Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) and citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 395 (1979)).
165
Id.
166
Id. at 60.
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of a seventh-grader for burping in class is precisely the reason police
officers cannot and should not be left “absolute discretion.”
167
V. BEYOND STANDING
Kenny v. Wilson’s success lies not only in achieving standing
and ensuring that affected students have their day in court, but in
bringing to light two important substantive issues arising under
Disturbing Schools Laws and to be tried on remand—namely that,
across the board, these statutes tend to be unconstitutionally vague
and are therefore necessarily prone to arbitrary enforcement. The
Fourth Circuit made two important points in its analysis of the
issue.
168
First, the court noted that a key element of the student
plaintiffs’ complaint was that, in general, students of color and
students with disabilities faced a disproportionate likelihood of
being disciplined under the Disturbing Schools Laws.
169
In
affirming the presence of a credible future threat, the court noted
that for three of the plaintiffs—one disabled, one black, and one
black and disabled—the “threat of enforcement [was] particularly
credible.”
170
The plaintiffs in Kenny noted that “black students like Kenny are
nearly four times as likely as their white peers to be charged with
disturbing school” despite a lack of justifying behavioral
differences.
171
In fact, it is true on a national scale that while black
students make up 15% of the public school population and students
with disabilities represent 14%, they represent 31% and 28%,
respectively, of all law enforcement referrals or school-related
arrests.
172
In 2008, the American Psychological Association
167
Id. at 61.
168
Kenny v. Wilson, 885 F.3d 280, 289 (4th Cir. 2018).
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Ripley, supra note 5.
172
Referral to law enforcement is an action by which a student is
reported to any law enforcement agency or official, including a
school police unit, for an incident that occurs on school
grounds, during school-related events, or while taking school
transportation. School-related arrest refers to an arrest of a
student for any activity conducted on school grounds, during
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(“APA”) created a “Zero-Tolerance” task force to investigate
whether such policies were effective in schools.
173
With respect to
their impact on students of color, the task force found that “African
American students may be disciplined more severely for less serious
or more subjective reasons,” with contemporary research suggesting
the disproportionate discipline “may be due to lack of teacher
preparation in classroom management, lack of training in culturally
competent practice, or racial stereotypes.”
174
A 2011 study of the Texas school system showed that nearly
three in five students were suspended or expelled at some point
within their middle school and high school years.
175
The study also
found that African American students were “far more likely to be
disciplined for subjective violations like disrupting class.”
176
This
discrepancy is not unique to Texas, South Carolina, or any one state.
In fact, in 2015, the federal government filed a Statement of Interest
in a case involving an eight-year-old third-grader and a nine-year-
old fourth-grader who were handcuffed by an SRO on multiple
occasions for behavior related to their disabilities.
177
The
government’s statement notes that minority students and those with
disabilities suffer even greater emotional consequences as a result
of such “coercive force.”
178
Often, the disabilities or behavioral
manifestations that lead to the contact are exacerbated by the
off-campus school activities (including while taking school
transportation), or due to a referral by any school official. All
arrests are considered referrals to law enforcement. During the
2015–16 school year, over 290,600 students were referred to
law enforcement agencies or arrested.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 3 (internal
citation omitted).
173
AM. PSYCHOLOGICALASS’N ZERO-TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, supra note
150.
174
Id.
175
Ripley, supra note 5.
176
Id. (“Even after controlling for more than 80 variables, including family
income, students’ academic performance, and past disciplinary incidents, the
report found that race was a reliable predictor of which kids got disciplined.”).
177
Statement of Interest of the United States at 1–2, S.R. and L.G. v. Kenton
Cty, 302 F. Supp. 3d 821 (E.D. Ky. 2017) (No. 2:15-CV-143).
178
Id. at 11.
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interaction.
179
For example, in S.R. and L.G. v. Kenton County, an
interaction between plaintiff L.G. and an SRO occurred because
L.G. ran from the officer when she saw him, for fear of being
handcuffed again.
180
According to data collected by the United States Department of
Education’s Office of Civil Rights for the 2013–2014 schoolyear,
although “[b]lack children make up 18% preschool enrollment,”
they make up “48% of preschool children suspended more than
once.”
181
In urban centers like New York City, the contrast is even
starker—though only “27% of city students are black, they
accounted for about 47% of all suspensions last school year.”
182
Students with disabilities are similarly overrepresented in the New
York City Department of Education’s suspension statistics.
183
Though they represented only 19% of public school enrollment, they
represented about 39% of all suspensions.
184
In December 2010, New York City lawmakers passed the
Student Safety Act which requires the Department of Education and
New York Police Department to provide quarterly data on school
safety issues, suspensions, expulsions, and arrests in schools.
185
Though suspensions have decreased over the past several years,
recent data shows a continued reliance on handcuff usage for
students exhibiting non-criminal behavior,
186
particularly for
179
Id. at 12.
180
Id. at 10.
181
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA
COLLECTION DATA SNAPSHOT: EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION 1 (2014)
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-early-learning-
snapshot.pdf.
182
Christina Veiga, New York City Schools Continue to Give Out Fewer
Suspensions, Though Racial Disparities Persist, CHALKBEAT (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://chalkbeat.org/posts/ny/2017/10/30/new-york-city-schools-continue-to-
give-out-fewer-suspensions-though-racial-disparities-persist/.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
The Student Safety Act, N.Y. C.L. UNION,
https://www.nyclu.org/en/student-safety-act (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
186
See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STUDENT SAFETY ACT REPORTING
2017–2018SCHOOLYEAR 3, https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/ssa_sy_17-
18_factsheet_nyclu.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
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children experiencing emotional distress.
187
During the 2017–2018
school year, 92.5% of students handcuffed during a mental health
crisis were Black or Latino.
188
During the Kenny district court proceedings, the Department of
Justice submitted a Statement of Interest noting that the South
Carolina statute (prior to its amendment) “raise[d] significant
concerns, particularly in light of the allegations of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.”
189
The statement emphasized that
“[t]he prohibition on vague statutes is rooted in the Due Process
Clause and the ‘ordinary notions of fair play’ it embodies.”
190
It was
also contended that the plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence
demonstrating that Disturbing Schools Laws were not being
equitably enforced, noting that the Supreme Court has continually
recognized that “where the legislature fails to provide such minimal
guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standard-less sweep that
allows policemen . . . to pursue their personal predilections.”
191
Indeed, these notions of vagueness and arbitrary enforcement were
at the center of the plaintiffs’ substantive due process argument in
Kenny, particularly because the students involved were students of
color and students with disabilities.
VI. WHATKENNYMEANS FORDISTURBING SCHOOLS LAWS
In an ideal world, the role of disciplinarian would remain with
school officials who, theoretically, are trained to work with students,
are familiar with the students in their school communities, and can
distinguish between serious and dangerous behavior requiring law
enforcement intervention on the one hand, and that indicative of
teenage immaturity or disability on the other.
192
The APA’s “Zero-
187
See id. at 4.
188
Id.
189
Statement of Interest of the United States, Kenny v. Wilson, No. 2:16-cv-
2793 (CWH), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218160 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2017).
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
See AM. PSYCHOLOGICALASSOC. ZERO-TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, supra
note 150, at 855 (“Findings from the field of developmental neuroscience indicate
that if a particular structure of the brain is still immature, then the functions that
it governs will also show immaturity.”).
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Tolerance” task force found that, in general, zero-tolerance policies
like South Carolina’s pre-amendment Disturbing Schools Law were
counterproductive:
The goal of any effective disciplinary system must
be to ensure a safe school climate while avoiding
policies and practices that may reduce students’
opportunity to learn. Although the goals of zero-
tolerance in terms of ensuring a safe and disciplined
school climate must be supported, the
implementation of zero-tolerance has created
continuing controversy by threatening the
opportunity to learn for too many students.
Moreover, the Zero-Tolerance Task Force’s review
of an extensive database on school discipline reveals
that, despite the removal of large numbers of
purported troublemakers, zero-tolerance policies
have not provided evidence that such approaches can
guarantee safe and productive school climates for
other members of the student population. Clearly, an
alternative course is necessary that can guarantee
safe school environments without removing large
numbers of students from the opportunity to learn.
193
But in a country that far too regularly experiences mass shootings in
schools,
194
it is difficult to imagine a conversation about school
safety that does not involve armed officers—despite an abundance
of studies suggesting that there are alternative approaches that may
prove more effective at reducing school violence, and that the
presence of armed officers often contributes to a sense of hostility
and anxiety in a school environment.
195
The “Dignity in Schools
193
Id. at 857.
194
Michelle Lou & Christina Walker, There Have Been 22 School Shootings
in the US So Far This Year, CNN (July 26, 2019, 9:39 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/us/school-shootings-us-2019-trnd/index.html.
195
In the same way, research shows that subjecting students to
daily interactions with armed guards, or the possibility that their
teachers could have a concealed weapon tucked inside their
waistband, may make students feel less safe. Such measures
send the message that a student’s display of anxiety and
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Campaign,” a coalition of organizations against increasing the
number of police officers in schools, advocates ending the consistent
presence of law enforcement and, instead, focus on training “school
staff [] to ensure safe and positive school climates, such as
community intervention workers, peacebuilders, behavior
interventionists, transformative or restorative justice coordinators,
school aides, counselors and other support staff, [on what they] can
and do prevent and address safety concerns and conflicts.”
196
Although Kenny has yet to proceed further through the court
system, in May 2018, the South Carolina legislature amended its
Disturbing Schools statute to explicitly restrict the statute’s
application to non-students only—albeit leaving room to punish
suspended students as non-students.
197
While this change on its own
was an immense victory for teenagers from South Carolina, the real
victory lies in their having been granted standing by the Fourth
Circuit to pursue their due process claims,
198
where, as seen in A.M.,
challenges against SROs or school administrators run the risk of
agitation might be met with lethal force, rather than calming
conversations.
Micere Keels, The False Comfort of Securing Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/opinion/school-shootings-security-
violence.html.
196
COUNSELORS NOT COPS, DIGNITY IN SCHOOLS CAMPAIGN 2,
http://dignityinschools.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/DSC_Counselors_Not_Cops_Recommendations-1.pdf
(last revised Oct. 2013).
197
The annotated law provides as follows:
(A) It is unlawful for a person who is not a student to wilfully
interfere with, disrupt, or disturb the normal operations of a
school or college in this State by: . . . (4) being loud or
boisterous on school or college grounds or property after
instruction by school or college personnel to refrain from the
conduct; (5) threatening physical harm to a student or a school
or college employee while on school or college grounds or
property . . . . (B) For the purpose of this section, “person who
is not a student” means a person who is not enrolled in, or who
is suspended or expelled from, the school or college that the
person interferes with, disrupts, or disturbs at the time the
interference, disruption, or disturbance occurs.
S.C. CODEANN. § 16-17-420(A)–(B) (2019).
198
Kenny v. Wilson, 885 F.3d 280, 291 (4th Cir. 2018).
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being dismissed under the shield of qualified immunity.
199
The
Kenny plaintiffs set a new precedent for students pursuing changes
to school discipline policies across the country.
200
Kenny establishes
a framework by which students of color and students with
disabilities can challenge Disturbing Schools Laws as both facially
unconstitutional and violative of substantive due process.
201
While changes will likely come through committed plaintiffs
like Niya Kenny, there is work to be done on the other side of the
Bench and in state legislatures. In 2011, Texas Supreme Court Chief
Justice Wallace B. Jefferson spent a day in Juvenile Court at the
invitation of one of his colleagues.
202
Chief Justice Jefferson, the
first African American appointed to the state’s Supreme Court, saw
a broken system that was “funneling kids from schools to detention
centers.”
203
The experience was disturbing enough to prompt him to
call a meeting with state legislators to see what could be done; to his
surprise, they were more than happy to participate in the change that
made the Disturbing Schools Law more specific and directed
towards disruptive behavior.
204
The legislative changes took effect
beginning September 1, 2013, the first day of the new school year.
205
In the first year alone, “some 40,000 charges were not filed against
199
A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1133 (10th Cir. 2016).
200
See Kenny, 885 F.3d at 291.
201
Id.
202
These are families in distress—very often uneducated parents
trying to deal with troubled youth, many of whom have mental-
health issues . . . . If it were my kid, I would be in that
courtroom filing pleadings to dismiss. But many of the kids
were from broken homes and very modest financial means.
Ripley, supra note 5 (Justice Jefferson, reflecting on his visit to juvenile court).
203
Id.
204
After his day in juvenile court, Jefferson met with Texas
legislators to see what could be done. It turned out that many
were as disgusted by the status quo as he was. They were tired
of reading news stories about kids getting charged with
disrupting class for spraying perfume or throwing paper
airplanes. It was a waste of taxpayer dollars, not to mention
embarrassing.
Id.
205
Id.
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kids,” a roughly sixty-one percent decline in criminal charges.
206
This is a striking example of how judicial discretion can be used to
influence policy when the status quo is creating devastating
circumstances.
Change can also start within the schoolhouse. For those who
believe that zero-tolerance policies are the only thing standing
between a teacher and the allegedly unruly teens roaming the halls
of our nation’s public schools,
207
it is worth noting that behavioral
concerns need not only be addressed through law enforcement
involvement. In three of the nation’s largest school districts—New
York, Chicago, and Miami-Dade—the school districts staff more
school police officers than social workers or counselors.
208
According to Dennis Parker, Director of the ACLU’s Racial Justice
Program, the discrepancy “reflects an approach to school discipline
and school safety that is ultimately counterproductive.”
209
Marc
Schindler, head of the Justice Policy Institute, points out that
“[w]hile there are conflicting studies about the effectiveness of
police in schools, . . . research shows they bring plenty of
206
Id. (“And there was no evidence that school safety suffered as a result.
The number of juvenile arrests for violent crimes, which had been declining
before the reforms, continued to fall, as did the number of expulsions and other
serious disciplinary actions in schools.”).
207
In April, a bill that would have eliminated the charge for
students at their own school, like the one Texas had passed,
came up for a subcommittee hearing in the South Carolina
legislature. A solicitor and former teacher named Barry
Barnette testified against the proposal. “There’s kids that will
not obey the rules. And you’ve got to have discretion for that
officer,” he said. “I wish it was a perfect world where the
students were always well behaved and everything. It’s not that
way.”
Id.
208
Jennifer Gerson Uffalussy, There Are More Police Officers Than
Counselors in These Major School Districts, TEEN VOUGE (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/police-officers-schools-counselors (“New
York and Chicago both have about double the number of police officers on
campus than school counselors.”).
209
Id. (“In fact, according to The 74, not one of the 10 largest school districts
in the country even has the suggested student to counselor ratio as recommended
by the American School Counselor Association.”).
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unintended consequences for students.”
210
Scholar-activists Thurau
and Wald suggest that “the access to SROs for consultation on
whether an act is an arrestable offense increases the likelihood that
school administrators will use such information for police
functions.”
211
Since it is doubtful that SROs will be removed from schools at
any point in the near future, there is enough information to suggest
that more training will provide officers with a better sense of how to
handle teenagers, particularly those with special educational needs
or behavioral issues that might manifest in disruptive behaviors.
212
The National Association of School Resource Officers exists as a
non-governing leadership body for SROs across the country.
213
In
its “Statement on Police Involvement in School Discipline,” the
Organization encouraged schools to complete a clear and concise
memorandum of understanding, emphasizing that “SROs must
[r]eceive [t]raining [r]egarding” students with special needs and
discouraging the use of physical restraint in almost all situations.
214
In many ways, however, these are small fixes for a much larger
problem. Until SROs’ responsibilities are clearly separated from
210
Cheryl Corley, Do Police Officers in Schools Really Make Them Safer?,
NPR (Mar. 8, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/591753884/do-
police-officers-in-schools-really-make-them-safer.
211
Thurau & Wald, supra note 69, at 984.
212
Several training requirements were recommended, starting with
knowledge of the school’s code of conduct so school officials
and police are on the same page. The Justice Center
administered the report in coordination with the Supportive
School Discipline Initiative launched in 2011 by the U.S.
Attorney General and the U.S. Secretary of Education. More
than 100 advisers including policymakers, school
administrators, teachers, behavioral-health experts, and police
collaborated on the recommendations.
Mark Keierleber,Why So Few School Cops Are Trained to Work With Kids, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive
/2015/11/why-do-most-school-cops-have-no-student-training-requirements/4142
86/.
213
See About NASRO, supra note 64.
214
NASRO Position Statement on Police Involvement in Student Discipline,
NAT’L ASS’N SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS (Aug. 14, 2015),
https://nasro.org/news/press-releases/nasro-position-statement-police-
involvement-student-discipline.
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those of disciplinary school administrators, and until American
public schools can deliver the same quality of services and education
to all students, no matter their zip-code, students of color, students
from low-income communities, and students with disabilities will
need people like Niya Kenny to keep their phones out and keep
standing.
